I THE STATUS OF THE LAW BEFORE BOUMEDINE V. BUSH, AND WHERE THE SUPREME COURT'S COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMANITARIAN LAW REQUIREMENTS STAND TODAY
In the heated debate over Attorney General Eric Holder's announcement that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a member of Al-Qaeda allegedly responsible for the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, would be tried at a Guanta´namo military commission, Americans, whether in favor of, or opposed to the decision, seem to be suffering from collective amnesia concerning how this decision came to pass. Mohammed's commission proceeding took place 11 years after 9/11, 1 for two reasons. The Bush administration unnecessarily, immorally, and illegally engaged in the torture of the worst perpetrators of terrorist acts, and the Bush administration repeatedly chose to advance its theory of an all-powerful executive branch at the expense of prosecuting these perpetrators expeditiously, against the urging of the most experienced and knowledgeable military legal advisors. That torture, however narrowly and self-servingly defined, was committed and has been acknowledged by President Bush himself.
2 That the supremacy of the executive power was a top priority over these prosecutions and other critical areas of national decision-making has been acknowledged by President Bush and many of his advisors. The second reason for 11 years of delay has as justification only a political agenda to establish the supremacy of the executive branch over the legislative and judicial branches. Whatever minimal guidance the Supreme Court provided in the process for the detainees in the decisions of Rasul v. Bush, 12 Justice Scalia, writing for all dissenters, argued that habeas review did not extend to aliens seized and held outside the United States.
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In this landmark 2008 decision of Boumediene, the Supreme Court thus held that the US Naval Base at Guanta´namo Bay, Cuba, was subject to the Ôfull effect' of the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution, and that Section 7 of the MCA, which stripped federal courts of their jurisdiction to consider Guanta´namo detainees' habeas petitions, Ôeffects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ'. 14 Accordingly, the alien detainees held by the executive branch at Guanta´namo after their capture were entitled to Ôinvoke the fundamental procedural protections of habeas corpus'.
15 With the extension of federal court jurisdiction to Guanta´namo detainees' habeas petitions, district courts in the District of Columbia Circuit began to:
(1) vacate their prior dismissals of such habeas petitions that relied on MCA's Section 7 as required by the Supreme Court's ruling in Boumediene; or (2) revive detainees' habeas petitions that were stayed until the decision in Boumediene was handed down in June 2008.
The decision left many critical questions unresolved. The Supreme Court did not decide: Self-incrimination is also prohibited, as no one is required to testify against himself/herself. 19 More generally, a statement of the accused may be admitted only if the military judge finds that it is reliable and authentically voluntary. 20 The accused can present evidence in his defense, and examine and respond to all evidence admitted on the issue of guilt or innocence and on sentencing. 17 Ibid., § 948(a). 18 Ibid., § 948(r). 19 Ibid., § 948(b). 20 Ibid., § 948(r). 21 Ibid., § 949(a). 22 At a minimum, the Ôall necessary and appropriate force' language of the AUMF Ôincludes the power to capture and detain those described in the congressional authorization'.
II THE PARAMETERS OF HABEAS PROCEEDINGS SET

23
In Al-Bihani v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit Court stated that the category of persons subject to detention Ôincludes those who are part of forces associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban or those who purposefully and materially support such forces in hostilities against U.S. Coalition forces.' 24 To meet the threshold showing that a detainee is Ôpart of' Al Qaeda, it is not necessary to show that an individual Ôoperates within al Qaeda's formal command structure,' although such a showing is sufficient to meet this threshold. 25 The inquiry should instead focus Ôupon the actions of the individual in relation to the organization' rather than relying on a determination of whether or not the detainee Ôformally received or executed any orders' from Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces. 26 The D.C. Circuit Court has opined that the evidence of action must surpass the bare minimum level of the Ôpurely independent conduct of a freelancer'. 27 evidence must relate to whether the petitioner was a Ôpart of' an associated force at the time of capture, rather than focus entirely on conduct occurring long before the US military took possession of the detainee. 28 Importantly, in the evaluation of whether a detainee should be continually held, the court should not inquire into Ô[w]hether a detainee would pose a threat to U.S. interests if released', but rather whether the hostilities themselves are still continuing.
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Over a course of successive decisions, the D.C. Circuit courts announced that the Government has the burden of showing in the district court, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the petitioner's continued detention is lawful, and that such a standard is constitutional. 30 On appeal, D.C. Circuit panels began summarily dismissing petitioners' challenges that alleged a standard of reasonable doubt or clear and convincing evidence was constitutionally required: Ô[l]est there be any further misunderstandings, let us be absolutely clear. A preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies constitutional requirements in considering a habeas petition from a detainee held pursuant to the AUMF.' 31 The opinion in Al-Bihani, which established the constitutionality of such a preponderance standard for use in these cases, explicitly stated, however, that the court's determination of constitutionality did not include an Ôendeavor to identify what standard would represent the minimum required by the Constitution.' 32 The court in Al-Adahi, after briefly reviewing the history of standards of proof used in habeas petitions, noted that the rationale for adoption of such a preponderance standard by D.C. Circuit courts following Boumediene is Ôunstated', and proffered its doubt as to whether Ôthe Suspension Clause requires the use of the preponderance standard.' 33 In Al-Adahi, therefore, the court proceeded with the case under the assumption, Ôarguendo[,] that the Government must show by a preponderance of the evidence' that the petitioner's detention was lawful because of his association with Al Qaeda. each petitioner was Ôpart of' Al Qaeda. The evidence is to be considered as a whole, and not in a piecemeal fashion with individual pieces of evidence viewed in isolation. 35 In Al-Adahi, the court, in very strong language, condemned the district court's Ômistaken view that each item of the government's evidence', on its own, Ôneeded to prove the ultimate issue in the case.'
36 Specifically, each piece of evidence must be examined in the context of the whole of the Government's presentation, and not cast aside before conducting an evaluation of the next individual piece of evidence. 37 A finding that a petitioner was Ôpart of' Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces, signifies that continued justification is lawful, and will lead to district court denial of the petitioner's request for the writ of habeas corpus.
38 The following non-exhaustive list of factors has been found, by the district courts and appellate courts on review, to be suggestive of a petitioner's being a Ôpart of' such forces. These factors are therefore supportive of an ultimate conclusion that the requisite standard has been met, when considered along with other listed factors, and all of the evidence offered by the Government in its entirety: admissions of travel to Afghanistan for purposes of fighting U.S. forces 39 39 See, e.g., Awad (n 29 above) 10. 40 See, e.g., Salahi (n 26 above) 753; Al-Adahi (n 23 above) 1107. 41 See, e.g., Barhoumi v Obama 609 F 3d 416, 432 (DC Cir 2010). 42 See, e.g., Uthman (n 26 above) 404. 43 See, e.g., Barhoumi (n 41 above) 427. 44 See, e.g., Esmail(n 38 above) 1077; Uthman (n 26 above) 405; Al-Adahi (n 23 above) 1110. 45 See, e.g., Barhoumi (n 41 above) 427. 46 See, e.g., ibid; Esmail (n 38 above) 1076; Odah (n 30 above) 15-16; Al-Adahi (n 23 above) 1109. 47 See, e.g., Esmail (n 38 above) 1077; Uthman (n 26 above) 405.
as Al Qaeda recruiting grounds 48 ; traveling along known Al Qaeda routes to and from Afghanistan 49 ; presence at Al Qaeda guesthouses during travels 50 ; lack of passport at capture 51 ; following directions of Al Qaeda or Taliban officials 52 ; and Al Qaeda documentation listing member names including the detainee's, when presented in conjunction with corroborative testimony from other operatives. 53 As for the conduct of the habeas proceedings themselves, the court, in Al-Bihani, held that the Ô[h]abeas review for Guanta´namo detainees need not match the procedures developed by Congress and the courts specifically for habeas challenges to criminal convictions.' 54 Basing their decision on the holding in Boumediene, which Ôexplicitly stated that habeas procedures for detainees need not resemble a criminal trial,' the Al-Bihani court held that the courts reviewing habeas petitions are Ôneither bound by the procedural limits created for other detention contexts, nor obliged to use them as baselines from which any departures must be justified.' 55 Therefore, the Guanta´namo detainees' habeas proceedings are Ônot subject to all the protections given to defendants in criminal prosecutions.' 56 Recognition of this distinction between normal criminal prosecutions and the habeas petitions of Guanta´namo detainees is especially important in the context of the admissibility of hearsay at such proceedings. Al-Bihani established that hearsay is Ôalways admissible' in such proceedings, and that habeas courts must only ask Ôwhat probative weight to ascribe to whatever indicia of reliability it exhibits'. 57 The court in Awad clarified the end result of such an inquiry, holding that Ôhearsay evidence is admissible in this type of habeas proceeding if the hearsay is reliable'. 58 A successful challenge to such evidence must establish, therefore, not that the evidence simply is hearsay, but that it is unreliable hearsay'. 59 The line of cases in the D.C. Circuit also established the varying standards of review for the pieces comprising the District Court's decision. The factual findings of the District Court are reviewed for Ôclear error' regardless of whether they were Ôbased on live testimony or […] documentary evidence'; this standard applies equally to the Ôinferences drawn' from such findings. 60 The clear error standard of review is a high bar to overcome, and the Awad court noted that if the District Court's Ôaccount of the evidence' is merely plausible in Ôlight of the record viewed in its entirety,' the appellate court is forbidden from ordering reversal. 61 A Ôpermissible view' of the evidence can therefore never be clearly erroneous. 62 Beyond the standards for review of the factual records, the appellate courts must review a district court's Ôhabeas determination de novo, and any challenged evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.'
63
These differing standards are especially important in the review of whether a detainee was part of a force associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban, as discussed above. This is a Ômixed question of law and fact.' 64 The question of Ôwhether a detainee's alleged conduct […] justifies his detention under the AUMF is a legal question' which is therefore reviewed de novo; the question of Ôwhether the government has proven that conduct,' however, is a Ôfactual question' which is reviewed for clear error under the very difficult standard delineated above.
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On March 7, 2011, President Obama issued the Executive Order 13567, entitled ÔPeriodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guanta´namo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force', 66 which applied to Ôthose detainees held at Guanta´namo' on March 7 who had been either Ôdesignated for continued law of war detention' or Ôreferred for prosecution'. 67 The Order continues to apply to such detainees even if they are transferred from Guanta´namo to another United States detention facility. 68 The Order specifically excludes Ôthose detainees against whom charges [were] pending' and against whom Ôa judgment of conviction' 60 Awad (n 29 above) 7. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Barhoumi (n 41 above) 424 (quoting Al-Bihani (n 24 above) 870). 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Exec. Order No 13,567 (2011), 76 Fed Reg 13277 (7 March 2011). 67 Ibid., § 1(a). 68 Ibid., § 1(c).
had been entered. 69 The Order establishes a Ôprocess to review on a periodic basis the executive branch's continued, discretionary exercise of existing detention authority in individual cases'. 70 As such, the scope of the Order is specifically limited: it Ôdoes not create any additional or separate source of detention authority', Ôdoes not affect the scope of detention authority under existing law', and, in relation to Boumediene, does not Ôaffect the jurisdiction of Federal courts to determine the legality of [Guanta´namo detainees'] detention', or interfere with their Ôconstitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. ' 71 This Order, however, stands in direct contravention of a previous Order issued by Obama in January of 2009, which ordered the closure of Guanta´namo's detention facilities by no later than January 2010, 72 and also demanded an immediate Ôreview of the status of each individual currently detained at Guanta´namo.'
73
The 2011 Order's review procedure sets a baseline standard warranting the continued detention of a detainee that turns on whether Ôit is necessary to protect against a significant threat to the security of the United States.' 74 The Periodic Review process outlined by the President is to be coordinated by the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Attorney General, and must be consistent with the requirements outlined for (a) an initial review; (b) a subsequent full review; (c) continuing file reviews; and (d) a final review of the decisions made by the Periodic Review Boards (Boards). 75 The Boards consist of one senior official from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security, and one official representing the Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
76
The Order requires an initial review for every detainee within one year of March 7, 2011. 69 Prior to the initial review, a detainee must be provided a written notice of the review, a summary of the facts the Board will consider in its evaluation, and the reasons outlined by the government for the detainee's continued detention. 77 During these proceedings, the detainee shall have the assistance of a governmentprovided representative or can retain private counsel 78 ; the detainee, with counsel, can present a statement, introduce any relevant information, answer questions, and call available witnesses with material information. 79 The Secretary of Defense, in opposition to the detainee's release, shall provide to both the Board and the detainee's representative Ôall information […] relevant to the determination' on whether the detainee meets the baseline standard described above, which includes Ôall mitigating information.' 80 The information provided to counsel may, on determination by the Board, be provided in the form of a substitute or summary in order to Ôprotect national security […] intelligence sources and methods.' 81 Following the hearing, the Board shall make a Ôprompt determination, by consensus and in writing, as to whether the detainee's continued detention is warranted' based on the above standard which must be provided to the detainee within 30 days.
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Beyond the initial review, the Order establishes a subsequent Ôfull review' and hearings by the Board every three years using the same procedures outlined above. 83 In the interim between full reviews, each detainee's continued detention is subject to a Ôfile review' every six months, conducted by the Board, consisting of a Ôreview of any relevant new information' compiled by the Secretary of Defense. 84 At each file review, the detainee can make his own submission: if a Ôsignificant question' is raised as to whether the Ôdetainee's continued detention is warranted', the Board will Ôpromptly convene a full review' consistent with the above procedures. 85 Finally, a Review Committee conducts a ÔBoard review' if a Committee member so seeks within 30 days, or the Board cannot reach an initial consensus. 86 The failure of the Board to determine that a detainee meets the baseline standard requires the Secretaries of State and Defense to use Ôvigorous efforts' to Ôidentify a suitable transfer location […] outside of the United States' that is Ôconsistent with [US] national security and foreign policy interests'. 87 A Committee is then in charge of reviewing, on an annual basis, the Ôstatus of transfer efforts' for those detainees needing transfer after a Periodic Review, in addition to the transfer efforts for detainees granted a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court. 88 The Order, and transfer process, is to be implemented in accordance with Ôlaws relating to the transfer, treatment, and interrogation of individuals detained in an armed conflict', including the Convention against Torture. 89 President Obama made a campaign pledge to close Guanta´namo by January 2010, returning as many detainees as advisable to their states. 90 Through US Attorney General Holder, the administration proposed trying some detainees in federal court in New York and others in military commissions at Guanta´namo, with the possibility of adapting a Thomson, Illinois prison for the detainees. 91 Congress responded by seeking to bar transfer of detainees to the US for prosecution and resisting funding for the Illinois prison (with some Democrats insisting on trials and some Republicans opposed to any imprisonment in the United States). 92 The New York mayor and others resisted trials in New York City; while the American Civil Liberties Union ('ACLU') and others insisted on trials, not commission proceedings. 93 Complicating matters even more, the Christmas Day 2010 attempted airplane bombing by a Yemeni suspended all transfers of Guanta´namo detainees to Yemen.
III THE TORTURE POLICY OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRA-TION AND WHAT LIES AHEAD FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS
President Bush transferred 537 detainees. 95 How many reverted to terrorist activities? As of October 2010, 81 were Ôconfirmed' and 69 Ôsuspected' of terrorist or insurgent activities of the 598 detainees transferred.
96 President Obama has transferred 69 including more than a dozen in Europe. 97 Where to return, or where and how to try the remaining detainees? As of April 2012, approximately 169 of the 779 detainees are remaining. 98 According to a January 22, 2010, Justice (State, Homeland Security, Department of Defense, Justice, CIA, and FBI officials) Task Force Report, 97 of the 240 who might be released were Yemeni. 99 Of those, 36 were eligible for immediate release; and another 30 would be eligible when Yemen is sufficiently stable.
100 According to the same report, 44 detainees were referred for prosecution in federal courts or commissions. 101 Most problematic, there are approximately 48 to be held indefinitely due to evaluations that they are too dangerous to release but for whom there is insufficient admissible evidence for a commission proceeding, according to Guanta´namo documents leaked in April of 2010.
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Experienced military interrogators are among the first to say that torture is often counterproductive, unproductive in terms of reliable information, and unnecessary despite all the Ôticking time-bomb' scenarios used in its justification. Much of this is a matter of common sense. How many of us would confess to virtually anything if subjected to torture on a daily basis? Many of these detainees are not reticent to assume responsibility for their crimes, and, in their fanaticism, are proud to admit to them. Among many other military heroes, General Fred Haynes, a young captain with the US Marines Combat Team 28 at the battle of Iwo Jima, speaks convincingly against the use of torture, describing how humanitarian treatment of Japanese prisoners in one of the most harrowing ordeals imaginable led to their cooperation in providing valuable information to their US captors. 103 What is the cost for torture of these Ôhigh-value' detainees? Obviously, it provided propaganda to our enemies, prompted problems and often disappointment from our allies, and tarnished a tradition of democratic and humanitarian ideals dearly paid for by those who have served so admirably and humanely in our military. There is also the legal cost. One of the most fundamental tenets of our constitutional law system and humanitarian law is that statements obtained by torture are inadmissible for any purpose. No judge, whether in a military commission or a federal trial, can convict on the basis of evidence obtained through torture. The bottom line is that the very terrorists who should have been treated the most cautiously by experienced military interrogators to satisfy unavoidable evidentiary requirements were not so treated, despite the substantial likelihood that evidence against them and others could have been otherwise obtained. As a practical matter, prosecutors, whether before the commissions or federal court, found themselves in the difficult position of being unable to rely on admissions that might have been otherwise obtained, and were required to find new evidence untainted by the coerced admissions.
So, in 2012, justice has begun for the victims of 9/11, as well as the victims of the Cole bombing in 2000. The proceedings are taking place in the only place they can be held, and in the only form they can be held, due to Congressional restrictions on any detainee even being brought into the US Some commentators, including notably John Yoo, one of the architects of the prior administration's torture policy, have said the decision to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is an Ôimplicit confession' by the Obama administration that military commissions are the Ôbest balance of security needs and protections for liberty.' 104 A forced decision is not an implicit admission any more than a statement obtained through torture is a reliable admission of guilt. Whether a Guanta´namo military commission is the best option or not, it is for the foreseeable future the only option provided by Congress. If Khalid Sheikh Mohammed can be convicted by a military commission, it will be a testament to the dedication of many unrecognized military investigators and lawyers seeking to undo the damage done from a policy of torture, with admissible evidence of guilt.
